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1. Introduction 
 
The efficiency of the market for residential real estate is studied widely, mostly drawing on 
US data. Much of this work concludes that real-estate markets function with suboptimal 
efficiency (e.g. Case & Shiller 1989, 1990; Ashenfelter & Genesove 1992; Mayer 1998). 
However, this work is generally unable to fully rule out market efficiency, but instead has 
pointed to the fact that optimal market efficiency is unlikely, given the large transaction costs 
in the real-estate market when compared with, for example, those that pertain in equities 
markets. Another reason for these findings can be attributed to market design. Differences in 
market design are studied extensively across various types of markets, such as equities, 
derivatives and foreign exchange. In relation to real-estate markets, the comparison focuses 
on prices generated at auctions and private negotiations. Much of this work is based on data 
derived from the US, and it has produced inconsistent results. Several studies find that prices 
paid at auction tend to be higher, and in one study by Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), the 
auction premium is as high as 13%. On the other hand, several studies find that auctions 
result in lower average property prices (e.g. Mayer 1998). 
Previous work is of limited application to the Australian market, even though the 
structure of the Australian market (especially in major metropolitan areas) is much more 
conducive to this type of research. In US markets, auctions are used as a last resort, usually 
when owners are under financial duress and are thus required to sell (Vanderporten 1992); 
hence, the results of such studies suffer from external validity biases. This contrasts with 
markets in major Australian cities, in which auctions are seen as a viable method for selling 
residential property. While private negotiations provide potential buyers time to consider and 
theoretically have an infinite time period, auctions provide several other benefits. The auction 
process promotes competitive bidding, ultimately removing any price barriers, which is 
particularly beneficial for unusual or desirable properties which are difficult to price. A set 
date of sale also encourages potential buyers to act quickly, possibly reducing the time to sell 
a property. 
There are two studies based on Australian and New Zealand markets (Lusht 1996; 
Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler 1998)1. Lusht (1996) examines selling prices for 163 
properties sold via auction versus 58 properties sold via private treaty in Melbourne, 
Australia, over the period January 1988 through March 1989. A probit analysis reveals that 
the choice of marketing depends on the age, condition and date the property is sold, with 
older and more run-down properties being increasingly likely to be sold via private treaty. 
After controlling for several qualitative characteristics of the properties sold (using a hedonic 
pricing model), Lusht (1996) finds that auction sales command a premium of AUD $19,326 
(approximately 8%). 
Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998) examine differences between selling prices at 
auctions and private treaty for 158 housing transactions in Christchurch, New Zealand, over 
the period September 1991 through December 1992. Initial results of a probit analysis 
indicate that larger, higher quality and more expensive properties are more likely to be sold 
via auction. However, the probability of selling a property is cyclical and is also related to the 
level of interest rates (during the sample period analysed, the level of interest rates was 
falling). Further analysis, which controls for several factors including the size, age, condition, 
location and construction of the property, reveals that properties sold via auction have up to a 
9.5% price premium compared to sales via private treaty. 
 
 
                                                            
1 See also Lusht (1990) and Newell et al. (1993) for earlier studies of the Australian real-estate market. 
4 
 
Frino, Lepone, Mollica and Vassallo: Impact of Auctions on Australian Residential Sale Prices 
 
Both the studies by Lusht (1996) and Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998) are 
based on small samples from one city over relatively short time periods (15-16 months). As 
with all financial markets, real-estate markets experience particular trends through time. It is 
thus difficult to draw conclusions based on such small samples over short time periods. The 
primary motivation for this study is to re-examine the impact that the method of sale has on 
selling prices. The dataset available for analysis in this study is significantly more 
comprehensive, covering sales of properties in five Australian capital cities over a four year 
period (2005-2009). By examining multiple cities in one country, major macro-economic 
variables are controlled (for example, the level of interest rates), leaving region-specific 
variations in selling methods and prices open for examination. 
Both the studies by Lusht (1996) and Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998) control 
for the obvious simultaneity bias in testing whether auction mechanisms impact on the price 
at which properties are transacted (i.e. the auction mechanism may determine the sales price 
but the likely sales price may also determine whether an auction mechanism is used). 
However, they did not control for possible selection biases in transactions. One of the biases 
is that many properties are passed in at auction because the highest bid is lower than vendor 
expectations2. It is possible that some of these properties are later sold through private treaty, 
suggesting that a portion of private sales are likely to be failed auction results that may have 
been sold at lower prices. The dataset available provides information on properties passed in 
at auction so that any potential influence can be controlled. 
Another motivation for the current study is the ability to examine house sales 
separately from unit sales. While both Lusht (1996) and Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler 
(1998) develop hedonic pricing models that attempt to control for differences in properties, 
there are significant differences between houses and units that may affect the ability of the 
model to differentiate selling prices. While houses in the same area (or even on the same 
street) often exhibit significant variation in age, style, quality etc., units exhibit significantly 
greater homogeneity. Units within the same complex generally share many attributes, and 
unit complexes within the same area are often viewed as close substitutes. Examining how 
the method of sale affects the selling price of units thus overcomes (to some extent) the need 
to control for variations in the attributes of the property. 
In addition to these primary motivations, there are other differences between this 
study and those of Lusht (1996) and Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998) that warrant 
further research. During the sample period examined by Lusht (1996), seller or ‘dummy’ bids 
were legal and commonly used, generally to promote bidding and inflate prices. More 
recently, this practice has become illegal. For example, the NSW Office of Fair Trading has 
recommended legislation to ensure that all bids and bidders are bona fide and that transaction 
prices are not artificially inflated. This led to the passing of the NSW Property Stock and 
Business Agents ACT 20023. Given that Lusht (1996) finds that properties sold at auction 
command a price premium, the potential for dummy bids to drive these higher prices is a 
confounding factor not evident in the current study. 
During the sample period examined by Dotzour, Moorhead and Winkler (1998), the 
level of interest rates was falling in New Zealand, from 11.8% at the start of the sample 
period to 8.9% by the end of the sample period. Anecdotal evidence suggests that during 
periods of falling interest rates, potential buyers are more aggressive to enter the market, 
potentially making the auction method of sale increasingly popular, and possibly driving the 
auction price premium documented by Dotzour, Moorhead andWinkler (1998). The four year 
sample employed in the current study covers periods of both rising and falling interest rates, 
                                                            
2 Passed in refers to the failure to sell at auction. Most of these properties are later listed for sale by private 
negotiation. 
3 Office of Fair Trading, 2003. 
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thus mitigating (at least to some extent) the potential bias introduced by uni-directional 
interest rate movements. 
Results of the analysis indicate that for house sales, auctions lead to greater selling 
prices across all cities examined. However, results for unit sales reveals that this auction 
premium is only evident in the two cities where auctions are less prevalent. Further analysis 
reveals that a self-selection bias is evident across the sample. After controlling for this self-
selection bias using a two-stage model, houses sold via auction generally command a higher 
price. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section details the 
dataset examined and the hedonic pricing model used. Section 3 outlines the methodology 
used. Section 4 provides details of the empirical results, and Section 5 summarises the paper 
and details several areas for future research. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dataset used in this study is provided by RP Data, Australia’s largest residential real 
estate company. This data contains details of property sales in five of Australia’s mainland 
capital cities, which is then matched to proprietary property listings and attributes data. The 
listing information provides details regarding the list type (i.e. auction or private sale), listing 
publication date, auction date, listing price, and agent details. The attribute information 
provides property-characteristic information such as the number of bedrooms, number of 
bathrooms, land size, air-conditioning, pools, scenic views and location. 
The data covers the period January 2005 to June 2009, during which time over 
536,000 property transactions are identified as being transacted via either auction or private 
sale. A potential bias inherent in the data is that many properties are passed in at auction 
because the highest bid is below the reserve price set by the vendor, and these properties are 
later sold through private treaty. Alternatively, some properties originally listed for private 
sale do not sell in an ‘acceptable’ time period and are subsequently sold via auction4. To 
control for such events a property is deemed to be listed if there is an uninterrupted 
advertising campaign (of the same type) not exceeding 3 months. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 (see Appendices for all tables) for house 
sales and Table 2 for unit sales. Over the period January 2005 to June 2009, there are 
approximately three times more sales achieved via private treaty than auction. Comparing 
results across cities, Melbourne has the greatest proportion of auctions, closely followed by 
Sydney. Conversely, Perth exhibits the lowest proportion of auctions. Across all capital cities, 
properties that sell via auction achieve higher prices, with both Melbourne and Sydney 
experiencing the greatest discrepancy in prices, particularly for house sales. The average time 
on market is similar for both auction and private treaty sales across all capital cities for both 
houses and units. 
Figure 1 depicts several further descriptive statistics for the entire Australian sample. 
It shows that auctions are a good mechanism to concentrate liquidity. The median time on the 
market – the difference between sale date and listing date – is relatively constant at 
approximately 25 days. Conversely, time on market for private treaty sales is higher at 
approximately 37 days. Time on the market for private treaty sales also exhibits seasonality, 
with large increases around the start of each calendar year. 
                                                            
4 There is no set time period deemed ‘acceptable’ for a private sale. Each vendor, together with their agent, will 
normally determine how long a property should remain listed for private sale prior to listing the property for 
auction. 
6 
Frino, Lepone, Mollica and Vassallo: Impact of Auctions on Australian Residential Sale Prices 
 
Figure 1 also depicts the absorption rate. The absorption rate is defined as the ratio of 
number of property listings to average sales volume; it measures the ability of the market to 
sell all of the properties for sale in a given amount of time5. A declining figure indicates the 
inventory of stock on the market is decreasing as more properties are being sold than are 
coming onto the market. A rising absorption rate implies that there are more properties 
coming onto the market than there are buyers willing to buy at the market prices. Figure 1 
provides anecdotal evidence of a relationship between time on the market and absorption rate. 
During periods where the absorption rate is increasing, the time on the market is also 
increasing. Conversely as the absorption rate decreases, time on the market decreases. During 
the period of examination (2005-2009), the Australian property market increased by 26.9%. 
 
 
Figure 1 
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This figure presents summary statistics for house and unit sales. The data cover the sale of all houses and units 
in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the period January 2005 to June 2009. Variables 
include the total time on the market, the time on the market for auctions and private treaty sales separately, the 
absorption rate and the total number of Australian dwellings over the sample period. 
                                                            
5 For example, if 100 homes are sold every month and there are 1200 homes for sale, it will take 12 months to 
sell all of the homes currently for sale. We have measured average volume over the previous six months, three 
months in arrears. 
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3. Empirical Methodology 
 
To compare the differences in prices of property sold at auction vis-à-vis those sold via 
private treaty, the following pricing model is estimated to examine the quality-controlled 
differences in prices: 
 
 ln(SPi) = B’xi + εi         (1) 
 
where SPi is the selling price of property i, xi is the vector of property and market variables, B 
is the vector of regression coefficients and ε i is the disturbance term. The vector of property 
and market variables (xi) is described as follows: 
 
• ListType is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is sold via auction 
• LandSize is the natural logarithm of the property land size 
• Bathroom is the number of bathrooms in the property 
• Bedroom is the number of bedrooms in the property 
• CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property 
• BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property 
• Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool 
• Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront 
• Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning 
• Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views 
• InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale 
• SSD is the statistical sub-division in which property i is located 
• SSD * ListType is an interaction variable of statistical sub-division and list type 
 
A potentially confounding factor in estimating Equation 1 is the issue of self-
selection. That is, individuals may select the method of sale that is most likely to maximise 
the selling price. Thus, any differences in selling prices inferred from the hedonic pricing 
model may be driven by the choice of selling mechanism rather than by any fundamental 
difference in prices achieved from auction versus private treaty sales. This same issue was 
addressed in Dotzour et al. (1998) by employing a two-stage model. 
We adopt the method used by Luez and Verrecchia (2000) in their study of several 
German companies that changed from a German to an international reporting regime. Similar 
to Luez and Verrecchia, we estimate a two-stage cross-sectional regression to control for the 
possible self-selection bias. The first step specifies a probit regression to model the choice 
8 
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between auction and private treaty. As previous research suggests that properties sold via 
auction are generally more unique and of higher quality, variables that relate to the size, 
quality and attributes of the property are included in the probit model. 
The second step of the two-stage technique is to model the link between the property 
characteristics identified and the differences in selling prices between auction and private 
treaty sales. This specification takes into account that the selling mechanism variable 
(ListType) is endogenous, and thus measures the marginal effect of an auction versus a 
private treaty sale. 
 
4. Results 
 
Results from the first-stage probit model are presented in Table 3 (see Appendices for all 
tables) for house sales and Table 4 for unit sales. Coefficient estimates on the control 
variables suggest that larger, better quality properties (both houses and units) are more likely 
to sell via auction, as are properties with views. The likelihood ratio statistics (LR) range 
from 15,188 to 166,166 for houses and 1,123 to 45,419 for units. These results indicate that 
the model explains significant variation in the probability of selling properties via auction or 
private treaty. 
Results from the second-stage regression are presented in Table 5 for house sales and 
Table 6 for unit sales. The adjusted R-Squared values are all in excess of 44% for house sales 
and in excess of 29% for unit sales, indicating that the model explains significant variation in 
selling prices after accounting for the possibility of a self-selection bias. All values for 
Lambda are statistically significant at all conventional levels, for both the house and unit sale 
regressions. All coefficient estimates for the ListType dummy variable are significantly 
positive for both the house and unit sale regressions. This suggests that, after controlling for 
self-selection between auction and private treaty, the auction premium still remains. 
Results from the generalised hedonic pricing model for the entire period are presented 
in Table 7 for house sales and Table 8 for unit sales. The hedonic pricing models estimated 
for each capital city all have adjusted R-Squared in excess of 44% for house sales and 30% 
for unit sales, highlighting the good explanatory power of the model. Consistent with 
previous research, the coefficient on ListType is positive for each capital city for house sales, 
indicating that houses sold at auction have higher prices relative to those sold via private 
treaty. However, for the unit sales regressions, the coefficient on the ListType variable is only 
statistically significantly positive for Perth and Adelaide, with Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane all exhibiting statistical insignificance. This suggests that the advantage to the 
auction method of sale previously documented (including in this study) does not extend to the 
sales of units. 
The majority of explanatory variables have coefficients with the expected sign and 
significance. Larger houses and units with views generally sell for greater amounts. The level 
of interest rates appears to have a varied effect across capital cities. For house sales, higher 
interest rates reduce selling prices in Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide, while they increase 
selling prices in Brisbane and Perth. For unit sales, higher interest rates reduce selling prices 
in all capital cities except Perth. There is significant variation across Statistical Sub-
Divisions, suggesting that even within capital cities there is a significant variation in selling 
prices. The interaction between ListType and SSD also highlights that the preferred method of 
sale, and the resulting sale price, exhibits significant variation within capital cities. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The efficiency of residential real estate markets is studied extensively in the finance 
literature. A major conclusion drawn from this research is that real-estate markets function 
with sub-optimal efficiency, with the method of sale (auction versus private treaty) affecting 
ultimate selling prices. However, the majority of this literature is based on the US real-estate 
market in which an overwhelming number of sales are executed via private treaty – auctions 
are generally used as a last resort. The primary motivation for this study is to re-examine the 
impact that the method of sale has on selling prices in markets where the auction method of 
sale is viewed as an equivalent (if not superior) method of selling property. The dataset 
available for analysis is significantly more comprehensive than that used in previous studies, 
as it covers sales of properties in five Australian capital cities over a four year period (2005-
2009). 
Results of the analysis indicate that for house sales, auctions lead to greater selling 
prices across all cities examined. However, results for unit sales reveals that this auction 
premium is only evident in the two cities where auctions are less prevalent. Further analysis 
reveals that self-selection (where a particular method of sale is selected to maximise the 
selling price) is evident across the sample. After controlling for this self-selection bias using a 
two-stage model, houses sold via auction generally command a higher price. This suggests 
that the auction method of selling provides a price premium over the private treaty method of 
sale. Further research is required to determine how and why this price premium exists. 
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Appendices 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics – Houses 
This table presents summary statistics for house sales. The data cover the sale of all houses in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the period January 
2005 to June 2009. Variables include – SPi is the selling price of property i; TOM is the time on market for property i; Absorption is the absorption rate for the suburb during 
the month of sales; LandSize is the natural logarithm of the property land size; Bathrooms is the number of bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms 
in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 
1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-
conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale. The mean 
and standard deviation (in parentheses) is presented for each variable. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Auction Private Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty 
Number of Obs. 50,837 81,184 37,564 73,421 7,777 77,930 1,577 74,246 7,549 41,117 
Ln (SP) 13.20 12.79 13.54 13.11 13.11 12.90 13.39 12.98 12.97 12.68 
 (0.4735) (0.3649) (0.5182) (0.4276) (0.3819) (0.3071) (0.5657) (0.3952) (0.3554) (0.3143) 
Ln (TOM) 3.432 3.328 3.416 3.505 3.368 3.248 3.403 3.250 3.440 3.541 
 (0.6692) (1.1381) (0.6968) (1.133) (0.8425) (1.243) (0.8596) (1.297) (0.7121) (0.8717) 
Ln (Absorption) 2.156 2.025 1.829 1.687 2.071 1.972 1.879 1.752 2.306 2.250 
 (0.3522) (0.3887) (0.4663) (0.5096) (0.5081) (0.5590) (0.5911) (0.6376) (0.3927) (0.3752) 
Ln (LandSize) -2.989 -2.722 -3.101 -2.852 -2.676 -2.658 -2.640 -2.672 -2.709 -2.747 
 (0.5697) (0.4840) (0.6479) (0.4165) (0.5943) (0.5380) (0.3978) (0.3581) (0.3765) (0.3790) 
Ln (Bathrooms) -0.122 -0.0794 -0.0636 -0.0685 -0.0908 -0.1060 -0.1505 -0.125 -0.1527 -0.1520 
 (0.1468) (0.1496) (0.1125) (0.1086) (0.1643) (0.1605) (0.1562) (0.1486) (0.1554) (0.1582) 
Ln (Bedrooms) 0.0379 0.0602 0.0403 0.0556 0.1068 0.0953 0.1003 0.1277 0.0448 0.0562 
 (0.1290) (0.1198) (0.1151) (0.1040) (0.1514) (0.1351) (0.1556) (0.1387) (0.1214) (0.1170) 
Ln (CarSpaces) -0.1408 -0.1140 -0.1203 -0.1060 -0.1265 -0.1131 -0.1918 -0.1805 -0.1939 -0.1876 
 (0.0956) (0.1022) (0.0749) (0.0771) (0.1015) (0.1028) (0.0857) (0.0936) (0.0753) (0.0812) 
BedBath 2.240 2.125 2.220 2.360 2.237 2.308 2.317 2.344 2.347 2.441 
 (0.7845) (0.8096) (0.7995) (0.8218) (0.8250) (0.8210) (0.7211) (0.6857) (0.8407) (0.8631) 
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Pool 0.0392 0.0298 0.1125 0.0999 0.1760 0.1023 0.2353 0.2164 0.0476 0.0493 
 (0.1942) (0.1699) (0.3160) (0.2999) (0.3809) (0.3031) (0.4243) (0.4118) (0.2128) (0.2164) 
Water 0.0011 0.0009 0.0105 0.0073 0.0039 0.0025 0.0025 0.0010 0.0017 0.0010 
 (0.0335) (0.0294) (0.1020) (0.0851) (0.0620) (0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0316) (0.0415) (0.0319) 
Air 0.1685 0.1525 0.1240 0.1340 0.1278 0.0793 0.2834 0.3623 0.3997 0.3769 
 (0.3743) (0.3595) (0.3296) (0.3406) (0.3339) (0.2702) (0.4508) (0.4807) (0.4899) (0.4846) 
View 0.0104 0.0100 0.0472 0.0330 0.0350 0.0080 0.0818 0.0330 0.0110 0.0140 
 (0.1016) (0.0996) (0.2120) (0.1787) (0.1837) (0.0889) (0.2741) (0.1787) (0.1043) (0.1176) 
InterestRates 7.757 7.633 7.659 7.521 7.712 7.626 7.567 7.504 7.914 7.610 
 (1.065) (1.082) (1.136) (1.188) (1.085) (1.105) (1.008) (0.977) (1.003) (1.083) 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics – Units 
This table presents summary statistics for unit sales. The data cover the sale of all units in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the period January 2005 to 
June 2009. Variables include – SPi is the selling price of property i; TOM is the time on market for property i; Absorption is the absorption rate for the suburb during the 
month of sales; Bathrooms is the number of bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the 
property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable 
which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 
when the property has views; InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale. The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) is presented for 
each variable. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Auction Private Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty Auction 
Private 
Treaty 
Number of Obs. 18,461 27,500 12,803 46,566 931 15,363 114 10,912 1430 12,487 
Ln (SP) 12.87 12.64 13.05 12.84 12.80 12.68 12.94 12.70 12.69 12.44 
 (0.3442) (0.3355) (0.4121) (0.3305) (0.3327) (0.2824) (0.3870) (0.3231) (0.3385) (0.3447) 
Ln (TOM) 3.356 3.369 3.358 3.414 3.316 3.134 3.457 3.067 3.298 3.322 
 (0.6557) (1.077) (0.6836) (1.082) (0.7878) (1.226) (0.7769) (1.331) (0.6908) (0.9217) 
Ln (Absorption) 2.122 2.006 1.570 1.493 1.561 1.595 1.649 1.521 2.181 2.164 
 (0.3984) (0.4151) (0.4826) (0.4862) (0.6722) (0.6459) (0.5574) (0.6199) (0.4646) (0.4942) 
Ln (Bathrooms) -0.2128 -0.2092 -0.1353 -0.1438 -0.1392 -0.1529 -0.2837 -0.2947 -0.2233 -0.2443 
 (0.1268) (0.1298) (0.1025) (0.0990) (0.1553) (0.1579) (0.1128) (0.0983) (0.1433) (0.1305) 
Ln (Bedrooms) -0.0708 -0.0712 -0.0472 -0.0530 -0.0588 -0.0538 -0.0767 -0.0833 -0.0523 -0.0518 
 (0.1226) (0.1205) (0.1229) (0.1274) (0.0970) (0.0891) (0.1039) (0.1191) (0.0830) (0.0902) 
Ln (CarSpaces) 0.0024 0.0075 -0.0100 -0.0007 0.0078 0.0038 -0.0110 -0.0190 -0.0173 -0.0167 
 (0.0615) (0.0638) (0.0546) (0.0515) (0.0638) (0.0554) (0.0543) (0.0479) (0.0520) (0.0475) 
BedBath 1.803 1.813 1.696 1.713 1.600 1.645 2.170 2.110 1.962 1.977 
 (0.6051) (0.6254) (0.5790) (0.5924) (0.6137) (0.6102) (0.5962) (0.6069) (0.6548) (0.6328) 
Pool 0.0148 0.0123 0.0631 0.0435 0.1096 0.0812 0.0175 0.0643 0.0042 0.0052 
 (0.1209) (0.1102) (0.2432) (0.2040) (0.3125) (0.2731) (0.1319) (0.2454) (0.0647) (0.0720) 
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Water 0.0027 0.0017 0.0193 0.0100 0.0430 0.0158 0.0263 0.0029 0.0112 0.0056 
 (0.0520) (0.0413) (0.1376) (0.0994) (0.2029) (0.1245) (0.1608) (0.0541) (0.1052) (0.0747) 
Air 0.1350 0.1022 0.0919 0.0681 0.1139 0.0672 0.1754 0.2407 0.3874 0.3401 
 (0.3418) (0.3029) (0.2888) (0.2519) (0.3178) (0.2503) (0.3820) (0.4275) (0.4873) (0.4738) 
Views 0.0152 0.0079 0.0693 0.0348 0.0752 0.0151 0.1579 0.0420 0.0084 0.0074 
 (0.1224) (0.0887) (0.2539) (0.1832) (0.2638) (0.1220) (0.3663) (0.2005) (0.0913) (0.0860) 
InterestRates 7.689 7.586 7.628 7.490 7.692 7.558 7.580 7.541 8.031 7.612 
 (1.180) (1.119) (1.188) (1.208) (1.186) (1.170) (1.081) (1.050) (1.007) (1.091) 
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Table 3 
Probit Regression Results – Houses 
This table presents results from the probit model for house sales. The data cover the sale of all houses in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the period 
January 2005 to June 2009. Variables include – SPi is the selling price of property i; LandSize is the natural logarithm of the property land size; Bathrooms is the number of 
bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to 
bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; 
Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a 
variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 21.65 <0.0001 18.37 <0.0001 15.15 <0.0001 12.20 <0.0001 22.78 <0.0001 
SP -1.482 <0.0001 -1.222 <0.0001 -1.028 <0.0001 -0.7977 <0.0001 -1.653 <0.0001 
LandSize 0.4526 <0.0001 0.3359 <0.0001 0.0306 0.0066 -0.0407 0.1430 -0.0857 <0.0001 
Bathrooms 1.906 <0.0001 0.9903 <0.0001 0.6179 <0.0001 1.902 <0.0001 2.856 <0.0001 
Bedrooms 0.2415 0.0002 0.6671 <0.0001 0.0446 0.6459 -0.5929 0.0004 0.0951 0.4448 
CarSpaces 1.052 <0.0001 1.448 <0.0001 0.8849 <0.0001 0.3619 0.0063 1.146 <0.0001 
BedBath 0.0807 <0.0001 0.0073 0.6596 0.0451 0.0729 0.2206 <0.0001 0.4037 <0.0001 
Pool  -0.0337 0.1249 -0.0694 <0.0001 -0.2051 <0.0001 0.0264 0.3347 0.0947 0.0080 
Water  0.4957 <0.0001 -0.0216 0.6294 -0.1243 0.2579 -0.1660 0.4938 -0.1017 0.6054 
Air -0.1930 <0.0001 -0.0858 <0.0001 -0.1862 <0.0001 0.1040 <0.0001 -0.1724 <0.0001 
Views 0.0921 0.0169 0.0088 0.6841 -0.5265 <0.0001 -0.2223 <0.0001 0.1852 0.0064 
InterestRates -0.0907 <0.0001 -0.0674 <0.0001 -0.0366 <0.0001 0.0072 0.5033 -0.1431 <0.0001 
Log Likelihood -68,115  -58,759  -24,250  -6,929  -17,746  
LR-Statistic 166,166 <0.0001 137,366 <0.0001 51,121 <0.0001 15,188 <0.0001 40,824 <0.0001 
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Table 4 
Probit Regression Results – Units 
This table presents results from the probit model for unit sales. The data cover the sale of all units in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the period 
January 2005 to June 2009. Variables include – SPi is the selling price of property i; Bathrooms is the number of bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of 
bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable 
which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the 
property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time 
of sale. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 20.82 <0.0001 14.69 <0.0001 10.87 <0.0001 12.69 <0.0001 17.36 <0.0001 
SP -1.559 <0.0001 -1.026 <0.0001 -0.6919 <0.0001 -0.8134 <0.0001 -1.161 <0.0001 
Bathrooms 1.927 <0.0001 0.2168 0.0520 0.4885 0.0037 0.3887 0.3708 0.1522 0.3468 
Bedrooms 0.1484 0.0157 -0.0758 0.3208 0.1820 0.3133 -0.057 0.8691 -0.2571 0.1609 
CarSpaces 1.820 <0.0001 3.335 <0.0001 0.0771 0.7892 -0.1419 0.8489 2.111 <0.0001 
BedBath 0.1807 <0.0001 -0.0348 0.0783 0.0319 0.4280 0.0163 0.8180 0.0223 0.5109 
Pool  0.2061 0.0001 -0.1040 0.0001 -0.1284 0.0208 0.4950 0.0428 0.1760 0.4293 
Water  0.1005 0.4497 -0.0318 0.5350 -0.2248 0.0239 -0.6263 0.0558 -0.2432 0.1416 
Air -0.1963 <0.0001 -0.1837 <0.0001 -0.1823 0.0014 0.2397 0.0130 -0.1068 0.0009 
Views -0.125 0.0344 -0.2386 <0.0001 -0.6976 <0.0001 -0.5598 <0.0001 0.0809 0.6379 
InterestRates -0.0781 <0.0001 -0.0693 <0.0001 -0.0533 <0.0001 0.0098 0.7727 -0.1900 <0.0001 
Log Likelihood -27,586  -28,663  -3,427  -587  -4,163  
LR-Statistic 45,362 <0.0001 45,419 <0.0001 6,220 <0.0001 1,123 <0.0001 8,154 <0.0001 
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Table 5 
Sample Selection Regressions – Houses 
This table presents results from the second stage regression for house sales. The data cover the sale of all houses in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over 
the period January 2005 to June 2009. Variables include – ListType is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is sold via auction; LandSize is the natural 
logarithm of the property land size; Bathrooms is the number of bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of 
car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a 
binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable 
which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 13.20 1,527 13.20 1,539 13.32 1,646 13.28 945.5 12.94 920.1 
ListType 0.1457 82.35 0.0973 59.36 0.0551 22.17 0.1881 24.27 0.1313 39.33 
LandSize 0.0781 46.02 0.1060 54.49 0.1311 85.62 0.1629 49.43 0.0279 9.060 
Bathrooms 0.0138 0.8000 0.5778 23.85 0.2367 13.22 -0.0443 -1.710 0.1784 6.560 
Bedrooms 0.6700 58.45 0.5984 38.36 0.5544 49.66 0.3517 19.81 0.6326 33.52 
CarSpaces 0.2017 26.78 0.2663 27.41 0.2862 40.54 0.3293 26.38 0.3461 24.93 
BedBath -0.0632 -21.88 -0.0158 -5.810 -0.0368 -12.60 -0.1107 -25.71 -0.0239 -5.020 
Pool  0.1146 28.08 0.0432 18.59 0.0583 25.59 0.0990 36.09 0.0652 12.49 
Water  0.1408 6.080 0.2258 30.04 0.0678 5.050 0.1484 4.340 0.1095 3.320 
Air -0.0041 -2.050 0.0136 6.580 0.0402 15.93 0.0405 17.29 -0.0530 -22.90 
Views 0.1124 15.66 0.0290 8.050 0.0966 14.15 0.1978 32.35 0.0416 4.320 
InterestRates -0.0063 -9.430 -0.0083 -14.22 0.0053 8.460 0.0311 27.71 -0.0071 -6.800 
Lambda 1.000 1,366 1.334 1,064 2.706 317.2 5.543 102.1 1.239 324.1 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6752 0.7981 0.6053 0.4423 0.4801 
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Table 6 
Sample Selection Regressions – Units 
This table presents results from the second stage regression for unit sales. The data cover the sale of all units in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the 
period January 2005 to June 2009. Variables include – ListType is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is sold via auction; Bathrooms is the number of 
bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to 
bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; 
Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a 
variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 12.61 1,189 12.50 1,481 12.55 876.7 12.51 562.3 12.44 653.0 
ListType 0.1201 52.58 0.0895 39.91 0.0395 5.940 0.1862 7.230 0.1527 19.59 
Bathrooms 1.2590 110.5 1.909 120.1 1.159 74.61 1.302 41.29 0.9348 39.34 
Bedrooms 0.2618 25.14 -0.0856 -7.810 -0.0690 -3.890 0.1636 7.200 -0.1192 -4.580 
CarSpaces 0.6726 37.53 0.6009 33.63 0.7493 26.80 0.9045 15.13 1.2792 26.35 
BedBath 0.1748 68.87 0.2154 74.41 0.1629 39.54 0.2032 41.38 0.1796 36.17 
Pool  0.0444 4.830 0.0120 2.980 -0.0450 -7.970 -0.0166 -1.550 0.0253 0.7800 
Water  0.1025 4.510 0.2356 29.97 0.2176 18.45 0.2158 4.650 0.1506 5.080 
Air 0.0533 15.96 0.0555 16.70 0.0556 9.180 0.0505 8.190 -0.0108 -2.150 
Views 0.0786 7.780 0.0469 10.97 0.0790 6.900 0.0735 5.680 0.1606 5.990 
InterestRates -0.0208 -22.83 -0.0190 -26.91 -0.0064 -4.910 0.0202 8.120 -0.0085 -3.970 
Lambda 1.046 1,012 2.077 581.9 5.203 74.21 5.920 14.96 2.414 135.9 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6112 0.6732 0.5432 0.2975 0.4012 
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Table 7 
House Regression Results 
This table presents results from the hedonic pricing model for house sales. The data cover the sale of all houses in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the 
period January 2005 to June 2009. The following model is estimated for each capital city –  
 
ln(SPi) = B’xi + εi 
 
where SPi is the selling price of property i, xi is the vector of property and market variables, B is the vector of regression coefficients and ε i is the disturbance term. The 
vector of property and market variables (xi) include – ListType is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is sold via auction; LandSize is the natural logarithm of 
the property land size; Bathrooms is the number of bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in 
the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable 
which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 
when the property has views; InterestRates is a variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale; SSD is the statistical sub-division that property i is located; SSD * 
ListType is an interaction variable of statistical sub-division and list type. Coefficient estimates and t-statistics are reported separately for each capital city. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 13.20 1,533 13.20 1561 13.31 1,639 13.28 945.2 12.93 924.3 
ListType 0.1223 12.37 0.0153 2.39 0.0678 7.16 0.1778 9.15 0.2425 37.31 
LandSize 0.0814 48.34 0.1041 54.41 0.1316 86.08 0.1629 49.43 0.0315 10.26 
Bathrooms 0.0335 1.96 0.5735 24.15 0.2362 13.21 -0.0433 -1.67 0.1878 6.96 
Bedrooms 0.6670 58.75 0.6048 39.55 0.5536 49.67 0.3514 19.8 0.6317 33.7 
CarSpaces 0.2017 27.06 0.2651 27.84 0.2853 40.47 0.3290 26.36 0.3440 24.95 
BedBath -0.0608 -21.25 -0.0153 -5.75 -0.0365 -12.55 -0.1106 -25.69 -0.0221 -4.67 
Pool  0.1137 28.11 0.0416 18.27 0.0580 25.51 0.0989 36.06 0.0658 12.7 
Water  0.1457 6.35 0.2267 30.76 0.0696 5.19 0.1472 4.3 0.1098 3.36 
Air -0.0032 -1.57 0.0155 7.62 0.0401 15.9 0.0405 17.29 -0.0527 -22.94 
Views 0.1117 15.7 0.0300 8.48 0.0922 13.52 0.1973 32.28 0.0428 4.48 
InterestRates -0.0065 -9.81 -0.0081 -14.21 0.0052 8.29 0.0311 27.63 -0.0069 -6.7 
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SSD1 0.8348 92.53 0.8500 157.03 0.5121 83.67 1.0465 192.34 -0.1372 -49.66 
SSD2 -0.0563 -13.06 1.2497 173.82 0.3399 89.9 -0.0038 -1.04 0.1732 41.13 
SSD3 -0.3621 -80.55 0.5246 153.64 -0.0219 -6.89 0.1530 50.68 0.3892 95.97 
SSD4 0.1838 22.52 0.3183 73.31 0.2622 70.28 0.0767 23.01   
SSD5 0.1172 21.37 0.0799 20.77 0.0278 8.28     
SSD6 -0.3048 -55.29 -0.0636 -16.67 -0.2989 -45.2     
SSD7 -0.0789 -15.28 0.8833 128.23 -0.2229 -56.85     
SSD8 0.8245 101.66 0.2604 65.37 -0.3308 -93.7     
SSD9 0.2726 63.71 -0.0035 -0.99 -0.2333 -66.22     
SSD10 -0.0338 -8.07 0.0265 7.46 -0.0761 -20.97     
SSD11 -0.1542 -32.92 0.9631 203.27 -0.0989 -20.72     
SSD12 0.4780 95.97 0.4945 154.82       
SSD13 -0.1512 -27.73 0.8542 225.04       
SSD14 -0.2604 -67.93         
SSD15 -0.2158 -46.21         
ListType*SSD1 -0.0394 -2.97 0.0537 6.52 -0.0030 -0.24 -0.0101 -0.41 -0.2279 -20.14 
ListType*SSD2 0.1499 14.02 0.1113 11.42 0.0584 5.31 -0.0443 -1.49 -0.1951 -22.04 
ListType*SSD3 -0.1515 -9.56 0.1001 13.03 -0.0239 -2.1 0.0853 3.51 -0.0769 -8.82 
ListType*SSD4 -0.0113 -0.86 0.0382 4.36 0.0124 1.04 -0.0312 -1.19   
ListType*SSD5 0.0553 4.83 -0.0453 -5.16 -0.0342 -2.76     
ListType*SSD6 -0.0227 -1.81 -0.0960 -8.31 -0.1014 -5.12     
ListType*SSD7 -0.1565 -12.68 0.0100 1 -0.1104 -7.62     
ListType*SSD8 0.0053 0.41 -0.0116 -1.28 -0.0713 -4.3     
ListType*SSD9 0.0047 0.43 -0.0821 -6.81 -0.0451 -3.68     
ListType*SSD10 -0.0596 -4.82 -0.1207 -11.37 -0.0361 -2.3     
ListType*SSD11 -0.0845 -4.78 0.1501 18.24 -0.0429 -2.97     
ListType*SSD12 0.1158 10.52 0.2645 34.63       
ListType*SSD13 -0.0544 -4.04 0.1826 21.38       
ListType*SSD14 -0.0956 -6.85         
ListType*SSD15 -0.0432 -2.72         
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6818 0.8061 0.6069 0.4426 0.4872 
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Table 8 
Unit Regression Results 
This table presents results from the hedonic pricing model for unit sales. The data cover the sale of all units in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth, over the 
period January 2005 to June 2009. The following model is estimated for each capital city –  
 
ln(SPi) = B’xi + εi 
 
where SPi is the selling price of property i, xi is the vector of property and market variables, B is the vector of regression coefficients and ε i is the disturbance term. The 
vector of property and market variables (xi) include – ListType is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is sold via auction; Bathrooms is the number of 
bathrooms in the property; Bedrooms is the number of bedrooms in the property; CarSpaces is the number of car spaces in the property; BedBath is the ratio of bedrooms to 
bathrooms in the property; Pool is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has a pool; Water is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property is waterfront; 
Air is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has air-conditioning; Views is a binary variable which equals 1 when the property has views; InterestRates is a 
variable that measures the RBA cash rate at the time of sale; SSD is the statistical sub-division that property i is located; SSD * ListType is an interaction variable of statistical 
sub-division and list type. Coefficient estimates and t-statistics are reported separately for each capital city. 
 
 Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Perth Adelaide 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 12.61 1182 12.51 1,471 12.55 872.5 12.51 563.3 12.43 652.8 
ListType 0.0584 1.96 -0.0084 -0.55 0.0387 0.9 0.1055 2.34 0.1780 9.16 
Bathrooms 1.257 110.83 1.909 121.8 1.158 74.57 1.303 41.4 0.9349 39.44 
Bedrooms 0.2602 25.11 -0.0963 -8.91 -0.0712 -4.02 0.1608 7.08 -0.1222 -4.71 
CarSpaces 0.6685 37.51 0.5811 33.01 0.7479 26.77 0.9012 15.1 1.2740 26.3 
BedBath 0.1746 69.18 0.2155 75.56 0.1628 39.52 0.2032 41.44 0.1799 36.32 
Pool  0.0447 4.9 0.0130 3.26 -0.0442 -7.83 -0.0156 -1.46 0.0246 0.76 
Water  0.1087 4.81 0.2236 28.85 0.2172 18.43 0.2090 4.5 0.1507 5.1 
Air 0.0519 15.64 0.0575 17.55 0.0558 9.23 0.0507 8.25 -0.0108 -2.17 
Views 0.0784 7.81 0.0425 10.1 0.0761 6.65 0.0728 5.64 0.1601 5.98 
InterestRates -0.0208 -22.95 -0.0189 -27.17 -0.0063 -4.86 0.0199 8.01 -0.0082 -3.86 
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SSD1 0.4480 57.14 0.5221 86.57 0.2892 31.21 0.1273 14.83 -0.3698 -49.72 
SSD2 0.0122 1.42 0.6615 101.88 0.1172 13.17 -0.1416 -15.05 -0.0373 -5.31 
SSD3 -0.3000 -25.01 0.3151 55.69 0.0132 1.34 -0.0040 -0.57 0.1432 21.92 
SSD4 0.1002 9.83 0.0328 4.95 0.0991 10.84 0.0031 0.36   
SSD5 0.0985 10.88 -0.1794 -23.35 -0.0360 -3.56     
SSD6 -0.1954 -13.88 -0.2145 -20.85 -0.2474 -5.99     
SSD7 -0.0366 -3.11 0.4175 62.8 -0.1362 -10.72     
SSD8 0.4114 42.15 0.0844 13.77 -0.2172 -15.51     
SSD9 0.2284 27.67 -0.1907 -21.81 -0.2887 -27.72     
SSD10 -0.0168 -2.01 -0.1197 -13.18 -0.1004 -7.1     
SSD11 -0.0855 -6.44 0.5773 100.25 0.0091 0.82     
SSD12 0.2417 30.19 0.3263 51.11       
SSD13 -0.2202 -24.09 0.5912 99.88       
SSD14 -0.2008 -19.53         
SSD15 -0.1696 -17.86         
ListType*SSD1 0.0523 1.74 0.1597 9.77 0.0494 1.11 0.4383 5.95 -0.2684 -7.05 
ListType*SSD2 0.0922 3.02 0.1443 8.93 0.0021 0.05 0.1045 0.87 -0.0593 -2.47 
ListType*SSD3 -0.1396 -2.95 0.0648 3.86 -0.0688 -1.3 -0.0381 -0.56 0.0144 0.64 
ListType*SSD4 0.0280 0.89 -0.0511 -2.81 -0.0669 -1.42 0.0037 0.05   
ListType*SSD5 0.0307 1 -0.0472 -2.44 0.0205 0.4     
ListType*SSD6 -0.0118 -0.31 -0.0728 -2.27 -0.1312 -1.97     
ListType*SSD7 -0.1278 -3.7 -0.0094 -0.54 0.1206 1.13     
ListType*SSD8 0.0692 2.24 -0.0330 -1.85 -0.0447 -0.85     
ListType*SSD9 0.0473 1.55 -0.0964 -3.29 -0.0554 -0.52     
ListType*SSD10 -0.0195 -0.56 -0.1223 -5.47 -0.0520 -1.05     
ListType*SSD11 -0.1179 -1.96 0.1962 12.06       
ListType*SSD12 0.1410 4.67 0.0438 2.24       
ListType*SSD13 -0.0458 -1.4 0.2202 12.3       
ListType*SSD14 -0.0324 -0.71         
ListType*SSD15 -0.0261 -0.61         
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6159 0.6833 0.5448 0.3006 0.4044 
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